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RIGHTS OF AN INJURED PARTY UPON CONTINUING
PERFORMANCE SUBSEQUENT TO A BREACH OF
THE CONTRACT
In Western Transmission Corp. v. Colorado Mainline, Inc.,'
A. J. Curtis & Company ("Curtis") entered into a contract to construct a pipeline for Western Transmission Company ("Western").
The contract specified that Western was to supply a certain size
and quality of pipe to Curtis for use in the construction.2 Western
employed Gulf Interstate Engineering Company ("Gulf") to act as
their agent in the supervision and inspection of the work, and Curtis subcontracted the work to Colorado Mainline Inc. ("Mainline").
Hereinafter, the parties will be referred to as though there were
only two, Western and Mainline. Although this results in some
technical inaccuracy, it is warranted for the sake of clarity and will
not materially affect this discussion of the contractual principles
involved.
When the pipe reached the work site, Mainline discovered
that because it was not the size or quality specified in the contract,
additional expense in the construction would result.3 About the
same time, Mainline also discovered that Western had employed
as its welding inspector a former employee of Mainline who had
been discharged. Because of these problems, the parties, before
construction started, met to reach a settlement. The results of the
meeting were: (1) that Western would pay an additional five cents
per foot to Mainline for the increased expense due to the variance
in size, (2) an assurance by Western that the welding inspector
would perform his duties in good faith, and (3) an agreement that
the parties would reach a settlement in the future regarding the
additional expenses caused by the variance in the quality of the
pipe. Although it was known to all the parties at that time that the
pipe was not of the specified quality, they did not adjust the con1 376 F.2d 470 (10th Cir. 1967).
2 Other terms of the contract, normal in these situations, were not considered by the court. One of these terms, which could have been
material in the case, provided that Western could require Curtis to
perform work not otherwise required in the contract; the contract also
contained a provision for computing the price of this work if the
parties could not agree upon it.
3 For purposes of this discussion, it will be assumed that at this time
there was a breach of a material condition which would relieve Mainline from its obligation to complete performance. This was the decision of the District Court and was not an issue in the Court of Appeals.
For a discussion of problems relating to this issue see: 17 AMw. JUR.
Contracts §§ 375-78 (2d ed. 1964), and 17A C. J. S. Contracts §§ 508-09
(1963).
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tract price to compensate for this variance because neither had any
idea of how much additional expense would be involved.
Mainline, upon starting construction, found that it could not
complete performance at the price and time specified in the contract
because of additional work incurred due to defects in the pipe.4
During this period, Mainline constantly protested to Western and
on one occasion it offered to quit work if Western would compensate it for the work done. Upon Western's assurances that an agreement would be reached, Mainline continued performance stating
specifically that the continued performance was not to operate as
a waiver of any rights it had against Western. After completion of
eighty percent of the work, Mainline decided that negotiation was
impossible and thus refused further performance. The parties tried
to reach an agreement but failed and Western was forced to employ
another contractor to complete the work.
Mainline then brought this action, seeking compensation for:
(1) the actual and reasonable cost of the performance it rendered,
(2) the actual and reasonable cost of the equipment it supplied, and
(3) the loss of profits on the original agreement. Western asserted
as a defense that Mainline had waived its rights to assert Western's
breach an as excuse for Mainline's failure to perform its obligation
to complete performance. 5
was not decided whether this was due to the bad faith of the
inspector or the defects in the pipe but apparently at least some of the
delays were the result of the inspector's bad faith decisions.
5 The court did not discuss at what time Western contended the breach
was waived. Since the additional consideration of five cents per foot
was to support a waiver of the variance in size, it probably was not
argued that this condition relieved Mainline from its obligation. This
leaves only the variance in quality and the bad faith of the inspector
which could operate as an excuse. Because the inspector's bad faith
was of a continuing nature and the Court of Appeals did not discuss
this, the bad faith probably was not the breach relied upon by Mainline. Therefore, the only breach upon which the excuse could be
based was the variance in the quality of the pipe. Western did not
argue that there had been a waiver supported by consideration, i.e.
Western's promise to pay five cents per foot more, nor that there had
been a new or modified contract. Apparently the reason that these
arguments were not advanced is that, from facts not included in the
opinion, it was obvious that the parties intended the additional five
cents as compensation only for the expenses attributable to the variance in size. This did not affect the breach due to the quality variance
other than the parties' agreement that they would settle this matter
later.
If the additional consideration was intended to support a promise
by Mainline to waive all of the breaches, this would have been sufficient to have bound Mainline to finish performance. Another approach
could have been that the promise to pay the additional compensa4

It

COMMENTS
The district court charged the jury to find whether there was
a substantial breach by Western and:
...whether... Mainline thereafter continued to receive benefits and

assert rights under the contract; that if [it] continued to go on with
the contract unconditionally after knowledge of the breach, then
such breach cannot be an excuse for [its] nonperformance; but if
...Mainline thereafter continued performance in reliance upon an
assurance from Western that [its] right to question the various
acts of Western constituting the breach would be preserved until
all facts with respect to the performance of the contract were defiwaive [its] right to
nitely ascertained, then... Mainline did not
assert claims for additional compensation. 6
The jury was then instructed to find that if Mainline's continued
performance was not so conditioned, Western must have materially
and to its prejudice changed position in reliance upon the continued performance before Mainline could be estopped from asserting the breach. The verdict and judgment were for Mainline and
Western appealed. Thus, Mainline had two chances; (1) conditional
performance, and (2) if not conditional it could still assert the
breach if there had been no reliance.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming, said it was "elementary" that the innocent party "... may continue performance
on condition that his right to subsequently assert the breach is preserved. In that event, the right must not only be asserted but must
be assented to by the other party.7 " The court held that the jury
could have found that there had not been reliance, "... . but appellees' [Mainline's] recission of the contract could be legally suplegal right to continue
ported by this legal principle as well as their
8
performance upon condition, after breach."
At the time of a breach, the injured party may choose one of
several courses of action. He may (1) terminate the contract; (2)
rescind it and bring an action for damages; or (3) waive the breach
tion was an offer to Mainline for a waiver that was accepted by its
performance. Under either of these theories, if it had been found
that Mainline accepted, the only way Mainline could have been
excused from its obligation would have been by another breach. To
establish such a breach, Mainline could then argue that in addition
to the inspector's bad faith Western had breached a promise to use
good faith in trying to reach a settlement. Since these theories were
not considered in the case, sufficient facts are not available to speculate on what the court's decision would have been had the intent of
the parties been to waive all of the breaches.
6 Western Transmission Corp. v. Colorado Mainline, Inc., 376 F.2d 470,
472 (10th Cir. 1967).
7 Id. at 472 (footnotes omitted).
8 Id. at 474 (emphasis added).
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by either promising to continue performance or by actually continuing performance. Although a promise to continue performance
may be withdrawn, absent estoppel or consideration, the general
rule is that when he makes the election by actual performance his
choice is final and cannot be withdrawn. Therefore, Mainline's
right to continue performance upon condition coupled with the
right to assert the prior breach as an excuse after the subsequent
performance is not as "elementary" as the court treats it.9
The court cited three authorities in support of the principle
upon which the decision rested; Professor Williston, 0 Autrey v.
Williams," and Rocky Mountain Tool & Machine Co. v. Tecon
2
Corp.1
The Rocky Mountain case involved a construction contract in
which the subcontractor's performance was consistently behind
that required by the performance schedule. Although the general
,contractor made complaints and threatened to terminate the contract, it allowed the subcontractor to continue after being assured
that the performance would be brought up to meet the specifications. When it became apparent that the subcontractor would not
'conform to the contractual specifications, the general'contractor
terminated its performance, thereafter bringing an action for damages occasioned by the breach. The court disposed of the case by
holding that there had been a continuous breach that could have
been waived, but because of the protests by the injured party and
the assurances by the breaching party there had not been a
waiver.'3
9 5 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 679 (3d ed.
1961); 3A A. CoRBIN, CORBIxN ON CONTRACTS § 755 (1960) (treats elec-

tion to continue performance as a waiver); and RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 309 (1932) (treats election by continued performance as a
recreation of a duty).
10 5 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 688 (3d ed.
1961).
11 343 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1965).
12 371 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1966).

13 The theory, that when the defective performance is divisible there
may be a waiver of part of the defective performance but not a waiver
of the entire contract is generally accepted although there may be
close questions of fact. See 5 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS § 741 (3d ed. 1961); 3A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 755 (1960); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 300 (1932). It is interesting

that the Rocky Mountain case relied upon § 688 of Williston rather
than § 741. The only difference between the two is that § 741 bases
the breach upon a subsequent failure of condition which although
waived earlier as to performance due at the time was not waived as
to future performance, and § 688 times the breach at the moment of
the first failure. Section 741 is consistent with Corbin § 755 and the

COMMENTS
In Western, the inspector's actions in bad faith and Mainline's
protests concerning these acts could have been a basis for the decision under a theory of a continuing breach, but the court apparently
did not rest their opinion thereon. The breach upon which the
court relied was the variance in the quality of the pipe. This was
not of a continuing nature as in Rocky Mountain since all of the
pipe had been delivered before Mainline started to work on the
job.1 4

In Autry, one of the subcontractors 5 was asserting a prior
breach by the general contractor as an excuse to relieve it from its
obligation to complete performance. The subcontractor had continued to perform after the general contractor had not completed
one of its obligations on the contract, which would have been sufficient to relieve the injured party of its duty. The breach was not
of a continuing nature as in Rocky Mountain but the court in
Autry did not give reasons for its decision that the prior breach had
not been waived.1 6
The Western court adopted the language used in Williston's
Section 688 discussing an election to continue performance after a
breach.
The principle is general that whenever a contract not already fully
performed on either side is continued in spite of a known excuse,
the defense thereupon is lost and the injured party is himself liable
Restatement § 300 but Williston § 688 is not. The only difference is
in timing and this will not be material other than in determining
damages. The Rocky Mountain court does not give any reasons why
the § 688 theory was used rather than § 741 but since they allowed
only the damages relating to the performance before the first breach
to be determined by the contract price and those relating to performance subsequent to the first breach to be determined on a quasi contract theory, it can be assumed that the court was using the § 688
principle.
14 Under Williston's § 688 theory it would not matter whether the breach
was of a continuing nature or not because, if the right was reserved
properly, it would not be lost. If the court used only Williston's § 741
theory this would be a material distinction.
15 The case was concerned with the rights of several subcontractors.
Since only one, Jinks, had protested the breach by the general contractor, he is the only party in this case to whom this discussion relates.
16 Williston's § 688 was cited as authority with Lousiana Highway
Comm'n v. Farnsworth, 74 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 294
U.S. 729 (1935). Farnsworth and the line of cases following it are not
authority for the conclusion that the right to assert the breach as an
excuse was preserved. This case is concerned with the reservation of
a -rightto damages only since the injured party had completed performance.
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if he subsequently fails to perform, unless the right to retain the
excuse is not only asserted but assented to.17

This statement, but without the caveat, is the general rule in cases
involving an election by an injured party to continue performance
after breach of the contract. It has been cited as authority in a
number of cases in which the caveat was not germane and the
right to retain the excuse was not considered. It is important to
note that the RESTATEM.,ENT OF CoNTRAcTs' 8 does not include Williston's caveat.
The authority 9 which Williston cites to support his statement
is Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Amerman.2' This
case dealt with a contract wherein the defendant agreed to insure
the life of plaintiff's husband. The contract provided that the insurance policy would be "null and void" if the insured was employed
as a railroad conductor. At the time the policy was issued, the
insured was a clerk, but subsequently his position was temporarily
changed to that of conductor on a freight train. After the defendant
received notice of this, one of its agents informed the insured by
letter the insurance was no longer effctive and "[i]n the mean time
you may quit braking, when our policy would be good." 21 When the
next premium came due, it was paid by the insured and accepted
by the defendant after a conversation between the defendant's
17 5 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 688 (3d ed.
1961).
18 "Where the duty of a party to a bilateral contract has been discharged
by the failure of a condition to exist or to occur or by the actual or
threatened non-performance of a return promise, he is again subjected to the duty if he renders any further performance, or assents
to the rendering by the other party of any further performance of a
condition or promise beyond what is due as the exchange for performance previously rendered, provided that he renders or assents to
such further performance (a) with knowledge of the facts establishing his discharge, or (b) without such knowledge, if (i) within a reasonable time after acquiring knowledge he fails to notify the other
party that he asserts a discharge, or (ii) the other party, not then
having received such notification, materially and reasonably changes
his position to such an extent that it would be unjust to allow a discharge." RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 309 (1932).

19 Although Williston noted several other cases as authority, in none
of them did the court meet the problem of Williston's caveat. See
National School Studios, Inc. v. Mealey, 211 Md. 116, 126 A.2d 588
(1956) (caveat quoted but not discussed); S. S. Steiner, Inc. v. Hill,
191 Ore. 391, 226 P.2d 307 (1951) ("The text quoted is inapplicable to
the situation before us.") Sheehan v. McKinstry, 105 Ore. 473, 210 P.
167 (1922) (text quoted but the caveat was not applicable).
20 119 Ill. 329, 10 N.E. 225 (1887).
21 Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Amerman, 119 Ill. 329, 332, 10
N.E. 225, 226 (1887).

COMMENTS
agent and the insured. The insured then, while working as a conductor, sustained injuries resulting in his death and the defendant
refused performance upon the policy.
The insured's widow brought an action upon the policy. The
defendant attempted to introduce evidence concerning the conversation between the agent and insured prior to the time the premium
was paid. Although this conversation showed that the intent of the
parties at the time of payment may have been to prevent the policy
from lapsing so the insured would not be required to apply for a
new policy when he moved to another job, this evidence was excluded from consideration by the jury. The decision was that the
defendant had waived its right to insist upon the clause voiding
the policy due to the insured's occupation.
On review, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the lower
court's holding that the evidence showing the intent of the parties
not to waive the condition should be excluded, and remanded for
further proceedings. The reviewing court admitted that,
It has been repeatedly held, ... that the receipt of the premium by

the insurer, after knowledge that the condition of the policy has
been broken, would amount to a waiver of the condition.... [H]ow-

ever, ... the assured in each case, in paying the premium, was
induced to do so, relying on the validity of his policy, and that the
the premium, would
act of the company, therefore, in receiving
2

estop it from setting up the forfeiture

Concluding that the basis of this rule was to protect the insured
from fraud and misrepresentations by the company the court continued,
There can be no fraud if the parties to the transaction are equally
informed of all the facts, and act independently upon such knowledge equally possessed by both parties .... If the assured knew or
understood that the company intended to insist upon the forfeiture
for breach of the condition.., and with such knowledge,... paid the
premium, the company might rightfully accept it for the purpose
for which it was paid, without being guilty of fraud in setting up
to waive,
the breach of such condition, which it had never consented
23
and which the assured knew it intended to insist upon.

It is important to note that the court did not propose a requirement that there be a formal assertion of and assent to the right as
suggested by Williston's caveat. Instead it took the view that
waiver by estoppel was an equitable doctrine to prevent fraud,
and when the intent of one party was clearly expressed to the
22
23

Id. at 335, 10 N.E. at 227 (citations omitted).
Id. at 336-37 10 N.E. at 228.
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other, the elements of fraud or misrepresentation were lacking.
Therefore, it was improper for the trial court to hold that the
breached condition had been waived.2
I. WHAT ARE THE RIGHTS OF AN INSURED PARTY WHEN
HE CONTINUED PERFORMANCE AFTER BREACH?
One of two situations may arise after the injured party has
continued performance subsequent to the breach: (1) the injured
party may complete performance and then pursue an action for
damages based upon the original breach, or (2) the injured party
may terminate performance before completion and bring an action
for damages resulting from the original breach. When performance
is completed, the question is whether the injured party is entitled
to damages. Although the same question is relevant when the injured party terminates before completion, another more complicated issue as to the injured party's obligation to complete the
contract is also presented.

A. MAY AN INJURED PARTY COMPLETE PERFORMANCE AFTER A BREACH
ANiD THEN RECOVER DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE BREACH?

The authorities 25 in the area seem to indicate that an injured
party does have the right to complete performance and recover
damages resulting from the breach, assuming that there had not
been an express waiver of damages. However, the courts have not
followed a uniform rule and some distinguish between performance when given under protest and when the injured party con24

In comparing this theory to the language used in Western, "[a]pellees'
rescission of the contract could be legally supported by this legal
principle [the fact that there had been no justifiable reliance] as well

as their legal right to continue performance upon condition, after
breach," 376 F.2d 470, 474 (10th Cir. 1967), the reader is left with the
impression that the principle can operate although there was reliance.
This is impossible because it is necessary that the right must be asserted and assented to. Therefore, the breaching party could not reasonably rely upon the performance when he knows that it is not
intended as a waiver unless the court would hold that by not getting
a substitute contract there had been reliance, an argument which the
Western court refused to accept.
25 "A waiver of a condition removes a limitation on the duty of the party
who does the waiving. It does not discharge an already existing duty
of the other party to make compensation for a breach that he has
committed." 3A A. Corn, CoRmwi ON CoNTRAcTs § 766, at 538, (1960);
5 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 700 (3d ed.
1961).

COMMENTS
tinues in silence. 26 Two of the areas in which the problem arises
are in connection with construction contracts and in the sale of
goods.
In cases involving construction contracts in which the con-

tinued performance after the breach was made under protest or
subsequent to assurances by the breaching party that the defect
would be corrected, many courts have held that the injured party
does not have an action for damages.27 In cases involving known
defects in construction where performance was not under a formal
protest, there are only a few cases28 which hold that the injured
party has an action for damages. However, when the breach in a
similar contract was a delay in performance rather than defective
award damages even
construction, courts may be more inclined to
29
when there had not been a formal protest.

It may appear that the courts should be more inclined to award
damages in the case where the performance is defective than when
only slow because a greater loss is possible assuming such a distinction should even be made. The reason that the injured party may
be favored when performance was slow might have been that even
if he had protested, the damage had been done, while if there had
been a prompt protest about the defective performance, the breaching party might have been able to correct the situation at that time
with little expense. Although the party who breached by rendering
defective performance may not be able to assert the defense of
estoppel since his only reliance was in completing the contract, he
should be allowed to show that the damages would have been less
if the injured party had protested or terminated the contract at the
time he learned of the defect.
In the area of sales, the cases prior to the uniform acts generally did not distinguish between the situations in which the
buyer was silent after receiving the goods and when he protested.80
28 Annot. 115 A.L.R. 65 (1938); 66 A.L.R.2d 572 (1959); 41 A.L.R.2d 1175

(1955).
27 Annot., 115 A.L.R. 65 (1938) and 66 A.L.R.2d 572 (1959).
28 Leonard v. Home Builders, 174 Cal. 65, 161 P. 1151 (1916); Sparling
v. Housman 96 Cal. App. 2d 159, 214 P.2d 837 (1950); Hattin v. Chase,
88 Me. 237, 33 A. 989 (1895); Wiebener v. Peoples, 44 Okla. 32, 142 P.
1036 (1914); Annot., 66 A.L.R.2d 572 (1959).
29 Louisiana Highway Comm'n v. Farnsworth, 74 F.2d 918 (5th Cir. 1935),
cert. denied, 294 U.S. 729 (1935); Selden Breck Constr. Co. v. Regents
of Univ. of Michigan, 274 F. 982 (E.D. Mich. 1921); and Annot., 115
A.L.R. 65 (1938).
3o Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 1175 (1955).
Sitlington v. Fulton, 281 F.2d 552 (10th Cir. 1960), decided the rights
of a vendor and vendee of real property under a sales contract.
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The cases did allow reasonable use of the chattel by the purchaser
under assurances by the seller that the defect would be corrected. 31
The UNIFOmVi COMMERCIAL CODE provides that "[a]cceptance does
not of itself impair any other remedy provided by this Article for
non-conformity. 3 2 However, the Code does require that after tender has been accepted, the buyer must within a reasonable time
notify the seller of the defects or he will be barred from all remedies.83
The requirement of protest by the injured party or assurances
by the breaching party that the defect will be corrected, is consistent with the rational of Northwestern that the doctrine of waiver was promulgated to protect the breaching party from fraud or
misrepresentations. When the injured party had let it be known
that he was not satisfied with the performance or when the breaching party had agreed to correct his error, the intentions of the
injured party are clear and it cannot be said that the breaching
party had been misled.
Many cases in which the injured party is awarded damages
although continued performance was not under protest seem to
have a common factor. The courts may overlook the fact that the
injured party did not protest if at the time of breach it would have
created a hardship upon him or greatly increased damages if the
injured party had terminated and immediately brought the action.
The most obvious example is when the owner of a structure which
is being remodeled must either vacate or be charged with waiver
by his continued possession. 4 Similar situations have arisen when
a party purchased a defective heating system which would require
great expense to remove, 85 or when it would require a large expenditure to move machinery and personnel substituting them with
those of another contractor after the breach of a construction contract, as in Western.
When the injured party allows the other party to continue
performance after a breach, this is a mere gratuity which the
breaching party has no right to demand although he does have the

31

Although the vendor could not give total possession at the time specified in the contract, the vendee went into possession of part of the
property. Later the vendee repudiated and the vendor brought an
action for specific performance which was not granted. However, the
court awarded the vendee damages resulting from the delay.
Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 1175 (1955).

32 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

33 UNIFORMi

COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 2-607(2).

§ 2-607(3) (a).

See note 28 supra.
35 Holland Furnace Co. v. Korth, 43 Wash. 2d 618, 262 P.2d 772 (1953);
Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 1175 (1955).
34

COMIVMENTS
right to refuse. 36 Also, the injured party may agree to release his
right to damages resulting from the breach, but he should not be
forced to do so if he wishes the contract to continue. If the breaching party has been induced to rely upon a representation by the
injured party that he would not demand damages another issue is
presented and the question of estoppel and reliance will then be
relevant.
There is some authority that when a contract to build or remodel a structure, particularly a home, has been breached by the
contractor, possession or payment by the owner does not constitute
a waiver of damages as a matter of law although the possession or
payment was not under protest.3 7 The decisions holding that possession is not a waiver can be based either on the hardship exception or the fact that the owner of the property has a legal right to
possession. However, the decisions holding that payment is not a
waiver present a problem that can not be explained by either the
hardship exception nor general contractual theories. These decisions, although few, do lend support to an argument that the courts
should be more concerned with what risks the parties assumed,
what their expectations were after the breach, and whether one
party had an undue or fraudulent advantage, rather than applying
an absolute rule in all situations.
A persuasive argument for allowing the injured party to recover damages is that he may under certain circumstances, be
forced to permit the party who breached to continue performance.
Although not universally accepted, there is authority to the effect
that the injured party must, after a breach, mitigate damages by
taking the most advantageous offer to complete the contract even
if this requires accepting an offer by the party who originally

30 Generally the breaching party may force the other to stop work upon

37

the contract. The reason for the rule is well illustrated by Rockingham
County v. Luten Bridge Co., 35 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1929). See, Annot.,
66 A.L.R. 745 (1930).
'Where a contract is made with the owner of land to erect a building
on the land, and there is a breach, by the contractor, of his covenant
to build it in a good and workmanlike manner, neither the occupation
of the house by the owner, after its supposed completion, nor the payment of the price, though accompanied by knowledge by the owner of
the defective construction, is sufficient, taken alone, to operate as a
waiver of the breach of the covenant." Leonard v. Home Builders,
174 Cal. 65, 68, 161 P. 1151, 1152 (1916). See Sparling v. Housman, 96
Cal. App. 2d 159, 214 P.2d 837 (1950); Hattin v. Chase, 88 Me. 237,
33 A. 989 (1895); Wiebener v. Peoples, 44 Okla. 32, 142 P. 1036 (1914);
Annot., 66 A.L.R.2d 572 (1959).
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breached.88 This doctrine is limited to cases in which there will be
no personal humiliation nor great inconvenience to the injured
party. This rule, combined with the theory that the injured party
loses the right to damages by continuing performance would result
in allowing a party to breach and then to offer the same services
at a higher price which the injured party would be required to
accept and by so doing lose his right to damages. This inequitable
result could occur, for example, when a contractor's performance
was delayed but since he had the necessary men and equipment at
the job site the work could be completed at a much lower expense,
or when the breaching party was selling a unique product.
Although the rules giving the injured party a right to damages
when he continues performance subsequent to the breach are not
settled, most courts require that the injured party protest before
he has even a possibility of recovery. This requirement is neither
inconvenient nor unreasonable and in addition to resulting in a
complete disclosure of the expectations of each party, it takes the
defense of estoppel from the breaching party. What will constitute
protest will vary depending upon the facts but a formal statement
should not be required. Acts and statements by the injured party
indicating that he expects compensation for the defective performance should be satisfactory.
B.

Is AN INJURED PARTY WHO HAS ELECTED TO CONTINUE SUBSEQUENT
TO A BREACH OBLIGATED TO COMPLETE THE CONTRACT?

There are two approaches which may be taken by a court in
determining that the injured party who has continued performance
after the breach is not obligated to complete performance: (1) the
injured party has not waived the breach as an excuse when this
is contrary to the expressed intent of both parties, or (2) the injured
party has a reasonable time in which to make his election whether
to excuse the breach or terminate, and during this period he can
continue to perform or receive performance. Under either approach
it may be necessary (returning to Williston's caveat) to consider
whether the injured party's right to later assert the breach was
assented to by the breaching party. There are strong policy considerations which indicate that both theories are acceptable in the
appropriate circumstances.
The Northwestern case held that estoppel of or waiver by the
injured party should depend upon whether the breaching party has
38 5 A. CoRBIN, CoRBn ON CONTRACTS § 1043 (1964); 5 S. WILLISTON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1359 (rev. ed. 1937); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 160 (1935).

COMMENTS

been so misled that to hold otherwise would be to allow a fraud.
The case also recognized that such a fraud is not possible when the
injured party expressed an intent not to forfeit the right to terminate which was conferred upon him by the prior breach.39
However, Professor Corbin states that "[n]evertheless, such a
contractor has power to recreate his former duty-sometimes by
mere voluntary expression of waiver, and nearly always by continuing to render his own performance or by receiving further performance from the other party ....
40 Professor Williston states
the rule:
The law simply does not, under the circumstances, permit a party
to exercise two alternative or inconsistent rights or remedies. Even
though he expressly states that he intends to reserve a right, he
will, nevertheless, lose it if he takes an inconsistent course....
unless the right to retain the excuse is not only asserted but
assented to by the other party.4'
Although Corbin escaped an absolute statement by the use of
"nearly always," he gives no indication of the type of case in which
this exception would apply. Williston's rule does include the caveat
which he made a part of his rule of Section 688.4 This caveat
therefore expressly applies to the situation found in Northwestern.
The same caveat is found again as the basis for the decision in
Western. These two statements and the two cases appear to be the
only authorities which recognize that there may be an exception
based upon intent. However there have been cases in which the
general rule of a final irrevocable election was followed even
though an unjust result was reached 43
39

Although the Northwestern court did not require that the injured
party assent to the reservation of the right, the insured has impliedly
assented by paying the premium after notice that the insurance company intended to reserve the right. See text accompanying note 24
supra.

ON CONTRACTS § 755, P. 497 (1960) (emphasis
added).
41 5 S. WLisTON, A TREATISE OP TnE LAw Or CONTRACTS § 684 (3d ed.
1961) (emphasis added and footnotes omitted).
42 5 S. WLUSTON, A TREATrSE ON = LAW Op CONTRACTS, § 688 (3d ed.
1961). See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
43 Perhaps the most dogmatic adherance to this rule without consideration of the equities of the situation occurred in Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co.
v. Settegast, 79 Tex. 256, 15 S.W. 228 (1891). In this case a landlord
refused to accept rent from a substituted tenant for fear he would lose
his right under a lease which contained a non-assignment clause. After
assurances from both the new and old tenants that this would not
happen, he accepted the rent from the assignee. In an action to have
the assignment cancelled, the court refused the remedy stating: "It is

40 3A A. CoRBIN, CoRn

a case in which actions are more effective than words." Id. at 262,

15 S.W. at 230.
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The Northwestern theory, that waiver is an equitable device to
protect the breaching party and there can be no waiver when it is
made clear to both parties that such a waiver is not intended, recognizes the risks assumed by the parties in continuing the performance after the breach. When the breaching party knows
performance may be terminated at any time, he is not justified in
relying upon an assumption that the work will be completed. Although the breaching party may be in a disadvantageous situation
since he is at the mercy of the injured party's right to terminate,
it was the breaching party's wrongful act which brought about the
situation, and in any event he is not required44 to continue or allow
the continued performance after the breach.
If the alleged waiver had been created only by a promise to
continue, unsupported by consideration, generally the waiving
party would be allowed to withdraw the waiver until there had
been actual performance. 45 Why should there be a distinction between a waiver based on a promise to perform and a waiver by
actual performance? By looking at only the performance and refusing to examine the intentions which were clearly expressed, the
courts created a situation whereby the party who had been injured
by the breach and tried in good faith to make the best of his predicament can lose even more. In order to prevent the injured party
from taking advantage of the other, an even more inequitable rule
of law was promulgated whereby the party who was in the wrong
originally can shift the loss due to his breach onto the innocent
party. Although the breaching party deserves some protection, this
purpose can better be served by the rule as stated in Williston's
Section 688, as applied in Western, rather than by the rigid rule
of election and waiver.
The other theory available upon which the principle stated by
Williston and the Western case may be based is that the injured
party has a reasonable time in which to make his election. It generally is recognized that the injured party does not waive by silence
until after the expiration of a reasonable time, but that when there
is performance this is treated as a final election.46
In Loew's, Inc. v. Cole,47 an employee invoked the Fifth Amend44

See note 36 supra.

45 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 90, 310
46 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 309(b)
47

(1932).

(i) (1932).
185 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 954 (1951). Another
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case generally in accord with Loew's
is Kostalac v. United States, 247 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1957). In this
case, after discovering fraud in the inducement to enter into the contract, the injured party continued to receive the benefits for about five
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menV8 while testifying before the House Comnittee on Un-Ameri-

can Activities. The employee was allowed to continue in his
employment relationship for thirty-three days, at which time the
employer finally invoked a provision in the employment contract
which allowed it to suspend the employee due to his refusal to
testify. Although the employee was aware of his employer's dissatisfaction, the employer had not expressed an intent to reserve
the right to dismiss and the employee had not assented to the reservation. The ninth circuit felt that there was sufficient evidence
for the jury to consider whether the employer waited an unreasonable time to invoke the contractual provision. Only after this reasonable time had expired would there have been a waiver or
election by the continued employment.
The court in Loew's impliedly rejected the rule as set forth in
Williston and in Restatement, Section 309,49 criticising both:
As soon as Cole [the employee] left the witness stand his conduct
was fully known to his employer. Are we to conclude that any use
of his services thereafter, no matter how brief, destroys any defense? ... Or, if [the employer's lack of facts as to how the refusal
to testify would affect his business] may not be considered, does the
party charged with the election
have a reasonable time within
which to make his choice? 50
The court continued discussing the evidence which it thought adequate to show that the employee had been given warning that he
might be released. After deciding that the employer did not have
sufficient facts at the time of the hearing to determine the extent of
harm to his business, it was left for the jury to determine whether
thirty-three days was an unreasonable delay in making the election.
The situation in Loew's is very similar to that in Wester. In
both cases it was agreed that the party who had the right to make
an election did not have sufficient facts available at the time of the
breach to make an intelligent choice and in both there had been
months. During this period there were negotiations and the injured
party did not pay for the benefits as required in the contract. The
court held that there had not been an election whereby the injured
party lost his right to recind. Nat'l School Studios, Inc. v. Mealey, 211
Md. 116, 126 A.2d 558 (1956) is a case similar to Loew's but in which
the opposite decision was reached. Both Restatement § 309 and Williston § 688 were cited as authority. Since the court in Mealey did
not discuss the caveat stated in Williston § 688 it is impossible to determine whether it disapproved or ignored the injured party's right to
reserve the excuse.
48 U.S. CoNsT. AMVEND. V.
49 See note 18 supra.
50 Loew's, Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641, 654 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 954 (1951).
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continued performance. It is important that in Loew's there was
not an assertion by the injured party reserving the right nor an
assent by the breaching party to the reservation. It is difficult to
determine whether the court rejected the requirement that the
right be asserted or whether it implied the assertion and assent from
the actions of the parties. Since the court criticized the theory, it
might be inferred that it discarded the requirement that there must
be an assertion of the right. Since it later discussed the fact that
the employee should have known from the acts of the employer
that he was reserving the right, it might just as reasonably be
inferred that the court preserved the requirement but relaxed the
evidentiary standards required to establish the assertion and assent.
If the court is merely relaxing the requirement that the intent
be expressed in words certain to the breaching party and that he
assent in a similar manner, this is merely a variation of the Western
case, in which the court is recognizing and giving effect to the intent
of the parties. If this is the case, there is a difference between
Loew's and Western in that the Loew's court was concerned with
whether the injured party had asserted the breach within a reasonable time, but the Western court did not consider this question. In
Western the parties established a time limitation upon the right
until a settlement could be reached. Since it was impossible in
Loew's to find an express time limitation, it was necessary to establish the reasonable time requirement. Therefore, it can be concluded that if the parties do insert a time limitation or express an
intent that the right will exist until completion, there will not be a
reasonable time requirement. On the other hand, if it cannot be
determined that a period other than a reasonable time was intended,
the court will impose such a restriction.
Although determination of what is reasonable is impossible in
vacuus such determination should rest upon (1) the reason for the
delay, (2) whether the parties were trying to negotiate a settlement, and (3) whether the injured party was trying to determine
the effect of the breach upon the expectations of value to him in
continuing the contract. If the parties were trying to negotiate a
settlement, a reasonable time would probably expire upon failure
to reach a settlement. 51 If the injured party was merely trying to
determine whether his loss due to the breach would be worth terminating the contract, another problem arises because in many cases
51 If the parties are able to reach a settlement upon which both agree,
there will be a novation or modification of the original contract. In
such a case problems concerning new consideration and pre-existing
duty arise, however, these issues are outside the scope of this discussion.
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this cannot be decided with any certainty until after completion
of the work. In that situation, a reasonable time will probably last
until tests or inquiries can be made so that the injured party can
determine with reasonable certainty the effect of the breach. Therefore, in some cases the right to assert the breach as an excuse may
last until the work is completed.
II.

IS IT NECESSARY THAT THERE BE AN ASSERTION OF
AND ASSENT TO A RESERVATION OF THE BREACH?

As has been indicated, Professor Williston's statement which
included a requirement of assertion of and assent to the right was
apparently based upon the Northwestern case. 2 The cases with
which this article is concerned primarily pertain to construction
contracts. Because of the unique nature of insurance contracts,
rules applicable to them should be closely examined before such
rules are applied to other situations. 3 In the eighty years since the
Northwestern decision, the law concerning insurance contracts has
changed significantly, but even in 1887 the court was trying to
protect the insured and his beneficiaries against forfeiture. Because
of this public policy against forfeiture, it may be reasonable to
assume that if the case arose today, the insurance company would
not have been excused from its obligation. Since performance in
construction contracts consists of services and materials which have
a determinable value, rather than a conditional promise to perform
as in insurance contracts, the parties can be placed in an equitable
position under the theory of unjust enrichment or quasi contract.
Therefore, many of the policy considerations existing in the insurance cases are not relevant in construction contracts.
The Loew's case is the only decision from which it might be
inferred that the assertion of the reservation need not be communicated to the breaching party. If the situation had been one in which
the breaching party had in fact been injured by his reliance upon
the apparent waiver, it is very doubtful that the court would have
even implied that there need not be an assertion of and assent to
the reservation. Therefore, it can be assumed that if there has been
52

See note 19 supra.

53 Although 1 G. CoucH, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw § 1:5
(2d ed. 1959) and 7 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 900 (3d ed. 1963)), both state that an insurance policy is basi-

cally like other contracts, Williston continues for 660 pages and Couch
for 18 volumes discussing the particular rules and principles applicable to insurance law. Of particular interest is Couch's discussion of
"Waiver or Modification of Rights Under Nonforfeiture Statutes." 6 G.
CoucH, CoucH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW

1961).

§§ 32:177-180 (2d ed.
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detrimental reliance upon the acceptance of the benefits or continued performance, the injured party will not be relieved from
his obligation to continue. This, however, does not settle the question of whether the injured party can assert the breach as an excuse
when there has not been an expressed intent to reserve the right
and there was no reliance upon the apparent election. If the breaching party cannot show that he has been injured, there does not
seem to be a sufficient reason to shift the loss due to his breach
upon the injured party. If there is a requirement that the reservation be assented to in situations where there has been an express
reservation, the court is merely requiring a formal expression of
intent which can be implied from the acts of the breaching party.
If the right has not been reserved, there is a possibility of detrimental reliance, as discussed previously, 4 and if the breaching
party has in fact been injured, the other party should not be relieved of his obligation to complete performance.
Although one may come to the conclusion that if the breaching
party has not been injured, he should suffer the consequences of
his breach, there is another factor that will influence decisions in
this area. That factor is the tendency of courts to find an obligation
to which the parties are bound at the earliest possible moment.
This view is reflected in the RESTATKmENT OF CoNTRcTs 55 which
introduces a presumption that an offer invites a bilateral contract. 56
The theory that the injured party may render partial performance
after the breach and then argue that although he did perform, he
did not intend to be bound by a contract, is inconsistent with this
tendency to find a binding obligation. Since under a quasi contract
theory of unjust enrichment the court can determine the correct
compensation for the performance, damages will not be a problem.
Although it may be argued that the court is making the contract
for the parties and that this is not its proper function, the reservation principle allows the parties time to try to solve their own
problems out of court without risking forfeiture. It may also be
advanced, as discussed previously,5 7 that the breaching party is put
into an uncertain position but this position, if uncertain, was the
result of his breach and he may relieve any uncertainty by forcing
the injured party into treating the contract as terminated. Therefore, the court should not be concerned by the fact that there was
not a binding obligation to complete after the breach because these
54 See text accompanying note 44 supra.
55 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS

§ 31 (1932).

56 The UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE also supports the tendency to find
as soon as possible an obligation to which both the buyer and seller
are bound. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-206.
57 See note 36 supra.
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arguments that may be advanced are not sufficient to support such
a decision.
The principle of allowing a reasonable time to make the election or an exception to the general rule of election based on an
expressed intent, although there had been continued performance
in either situation, recognizes the business context in which many
of these cases arise. When the election theory became entrenched
in the law, contracts were of a simple nature and both parties usually had all the information necessary to make an immediate decision whether to elect to treat the contract as breached or to continue
and thereby waive the condition precedent to their performance.
Today contracts can involve many parties, many other contractual
relationships can be affected by the one contract, and it may be
necessary to compile volumes of information or make complicated
and time consuming tests before it is possible to even estimate the
effect that a variance in specifications will have. It is against all
practical considerations to require that a construction project involving many variables be halted while the injured party negotiates
and compiles information necessary for him to make an intelligent
decision.
Another policy that these two principles advance is that generally it is desirable to encourage the parties to work out their
differences outside of the courtroom. Merely entering into negotiations does not result in a waiver and cannot be justifiably relied
upon for this very reason.66 In view of the previous pressures that
bear upon the parties, particularly when relationships with others
are involved, it is unreasonable to require a complete halt for fear
that there will be a waiver or election that the injured party cannot escape. The statement of the court in Kostelac v. United States59
reflects this view well.
It would appear that as a matter of policy the law ought to encourage the parties to reach amicable settlements of disputes of this
kind, and that a rule of law which penalizes a party who seeks
such a settlement by depriving him of his right to rescind is both
harsh and contrary to sound policy.60
There certainly is not complete agreement on the general issue
of when the courts should disregard the intent of the contractual
parties as shown by either their expression or actions. However, in
58 5 S. WILLisToN, A TamxTrSE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1460 (rev. ed.

1937) states: "Unsuccessful negotiations looking toward performance
can hardly be considered inconsistent with a continuing right of rescission...." Id. at 4111.

59 247 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1957).
60 Id. at 728.
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the situations presented by the cases previously discussed in which
fraud or unconscionable advantage are not considerations, the intent of the parties should be of primary concern. When the breaching party agrees to assume the risk presented by allowing the
injured party to continue with a reservation of the excuse, there is
no reason to shift the loss due to the breach upon the injured party.
III.

CONCLUSION

The old theory that when a party has two alternatives open to
him after a breach and he pursues one the other is lost, coupled
with the rule that "actions are more effective than words,"' ' has
produced some cases in which the results are contrary to what
seems to be the correct and just decision in view of the facts and
surrounding circumstances. The Western and Loew's cases are situations in which the courts felt an exception to the rule was needed.
These cases are far from being the majority but they may be establishing a trend which will result in the courts taking a closer look
at the intent and equities of the parties even when there has been
continued performance.
Rules must be established governing what the rights of the
parties are after a breach. It would be foolish for a contractor to
continue performance reserving his right to assert the breach as an
excuse in the future, but undoubtedly the situation will arise again.
If the courts in these future cases follow the lead of the courts in
Western and Loew's, the injured party may be better able to appraise his position after the other has breached, and he will be in a
better position to try to negotiate a settlement which will be satisfactory to both parties.
Samuel P. Baird, '69

61

See note 43 supra.

